Few Canadians today could define a jitney, and historians have largely forgotten its meaning. The jitney, neglected even in the United States, land of its origin and greatest incidence, is remembered only as a passing fad, a minor irritation to public transit, so ephemeral that even its capacity to do harm was mercifully attenuated. Since even historians of urban transportation have regarded it as an epiphenomenon, it is not surprising that the scattered references in the published literature on the Canadian jitney do not add up to one good-sized article. A handful of historical articles about it do exist, but the jitney may well be one of the few facets of American history to lack a monograph. 1 So why bother with jitneys? First, because they once flourished in the thousands. From the hearth of innovation in Los Angeles in the summer of 1914, they spread to Vancouver and Victoria that November -by 1 April 1915 they had also reached Edmonton, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Toronto. By June 1916 the jitney had surfaced in more than 24 Canadian municipalities, and its use had been projected (and probably implemented) in countless others (see Table 1 ).
By late June 1915, which was the zenith of their popularity in North America, there would have been about 3,500-3,800 jitneys in Canada, as compared to 62,000 in the United States (see Table 2 for the breakdown by Canadian city). The Canadian estimate may rise as more is learned about jitneying in suburbs and small towns. Table 2 reveals that Canadians did not have a uniform experience with jitneys: only in six cities did a sufficient number of entrepreneurs enter the industry for it to gain staying power. Elsewhere only a handful of jitneys surfaced and these soon disappeared without trace. With jitneys, as with so many aspets of Canada's development, we find "limited identities." (Possible sources of local and regional variation in the Canadian jitney experience are discussed in an appendix.)
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For most of the country, however, jitneys did not make much of an impression.
The second reason for studying jitneys can be found in recent research -most notably by D. F Noble, David Hounshell, R.S. Cowan, Wiebe Bijker, and Trevor Pinch -which has made us aware that any attempt to understand the social shaping of technology, including transportation systems, must include an examination of paths not taken. 3 The jitney was a plausible alternative to the automobile, the streetcar, and the transit bus; yet it took remarkably little time for most Canadian municipalities to reject it. The celerity of these decisions suggests that the jitney violated fundamental values. An examination of this failed innovation may shed new light on the Canadian mentality and power structure in the early automotive era.
There is a third, more impelling, reason for studying the Canadian jitney: the claim of historians Ross Eckert and George Hilton in 1972 that "the jitney episode was central to the history of urban transportation" and that "the policy of putting down the jitneys led directly to much of what is looked upon as most unsatisfactory in contemporary urban transport." 4 This is quite an assertion, especially given the credentials of Eckert and Hilton in American transportation history. Yet it has not shaped subsequent historical research, either as an hypothesis to test or as an argument to refute.
One can only surmise the reasons for the discipline's indifference. First, transportation history has -despite its obvious relevance to daily life -been neglected in both Canada and the United States. Secondly, Eckert and Hilton did not attempt systematically to prove their claim; indeed, they devoted most of their article to proving how easy it was to legislate the jitneys out of existence. For many readers the retelling of the rout confirmed the marginality of the subject. Finally, few historians in the 1970s wanted to believe the thesis implicit in these statements by Eckert and Hilton, that the world needed more
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Competition's Moment automobiles, even in the guise of public vehicles. Most probably still resist the notion.
Nevertheless, this article is designed to awaken historical interest in jitneys, to raise the possibility (using Canadian evidence) that
Eckert and Hilton are correct, and to suggest that not only was the jitney a significant innovation, whose brief life is worth studying, but that its fate is also the key to understanding the decline of public transportation in Canada's cities in the automotive era.
So what is a jitney? Modern specialists agree that it is a large automobile or small van that "operates over more or less fixed routes" but has "apart from termini, neither fixed stops nor fixed schedules." It is differentiated from other types of paratransit, such as shared-ride taxis and dial-a-ride services for the disabled (see Table 3 ), by having a "relatively fixed" route and by being "hailed on the street by potential passengers." This latter feature is a defining characteristic according to Ronald Kirby, who has declared jitneys a "form of shared ride service which might be termed hail-a-ride."
The route is also essential: although minor deviations are permissable, a jitney cannot build up a loyal clientele unless it quickly returns to its route or else people will not get into the habit of waiting for it. 5 Jitneys, thus defined, are found in many cities in less- In less-developed countries, jitneys often attract automobile owners who would not otherwise use public transit. In cities where they are marginally more expensive than the regular bus, this cost factor is connected in part to their social exclusivity, but more important to their superior frequency: as Wilfred Owen has pointed out, "In most cities that operate these public automobiles, there is almost always a vehicle in sight, eliminating much of the waiting time that frustrates patrons of conventional vehicles." As well, jitneys, being small and manoeuvreable, travel in most cities as swiftly as private automobiles and, when driven with taxi-like élan, can actually reduce overall commuting times for motorists who lack a guaranteed parking space. Moreover, and this feature explains the popularity with many of the city's poor of a jitney experiment in Los Angeles in 1982 (even though it charged a fare slightly higher than the subsidized bus), jitneys are less intimidating and bureaucratic than conventional transit: Chicanos, for example, were able to drive to work in Spanish. The Los Angeles experiment failed, however, because public automobiles -jitneys -can only generate sufficient revenue to support an owner-operator; they have not proven to be an attractive investment for corporate capital. Similar to taxis in markets with unrestricted entry, the jitney is by reason of its economic marginality destined to belong to the petty proprietor.
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Since they are small, jitneys have higher labour costs per seat-mile than other forms of public transit; to compete, they must maximize their revenue per vehicle-hour. Thus they focus on the main commuting routes, where they handle short-haul traffic, primarily at rush hour. These operating practices have produced a universal indictment from outraged bus and street railway companies -jitneys skim the "cream" of the public transit business, the short-haul, rush-hour strap-hanger whose fares subsidize less remunerative service to the outlying suburbs., The jitney is, accordingly, denounced as a threat to the overall viability of public mass transit. 8 This "cream" thesis has always seemed plausible, and has since 1915 been the official rationale for suppression of the jitney; yet even in 1915 there were traction experts who recognized that rush-hour service is the wormwood of public transit, not its "cream." Indeed, it has been the primary source of the industry's decline. Although this assertion is admittedly counter-intuitive, it is surprisingly easy to demonstrate. First, consider the economics: a public carrier has to keep additional drivers and vehicles in expensive reserve for peak-load operations: for example, peak-hour service in Vancouver in December 1913 required 70 per cent more cars than the base service. Although some of the surplus drivers can be used to drive sightseeing vehicles during off-peak hours, union rules normally prevent their full employment. As for the extra vehicles, most of these are too outmoded and decrepit to be used for anything but rush-hour service. These vehicles have high maintenance costs and their numbers have risen as the gap between off-peak and peak loads has gradually widened with shoppers, movie-goers, and other non-commuters switching to walking or to the automobile. 9 The use of the jitney, if restricted to rush hour, thus helps conventional public transit to even out its passenger loads, thereby allowing it to reduce its overall costs. There are, however, more than economics at stake: rush-hour service drives away customers who, experiencing public transit at its worst, prefer to walk or drive instead. Consider the Toronto Street Railway in March 1914: even though it ran more than twice as many cars between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. as it did at noon or 8:00 p.m., its rush-hour trams were infamously overcrowded (an average of 42 per cent of its passengers had to stand during the evening peak -twice as many as a report to the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board deemed acceptable). Crowding of this magnitude repelled customers.
10
Even those who found a seat were (and are) often appalled by what they found themselves riding in, for the aged equipment put on for rush hour often offended commuters' personal dignity as well as their civic pride. Those who rode public transit only during the peak hours knew the service at its worst: aged equipment prone to breakdown, which in the street railway era meant long delays over an entire line. From our present vantage point, looking back through a romantic haze or from the window of "light-rail" transit bought in the 1970s and thus only halfway through its 30-year amortization, we find it difficult to appreciate the extent to which rush-hour service had alienated Canadians by 1914-29. Until then, many Canadians were willing to pay a premium to ride in a bus: in the mid 1920s not only did traction companies operate extra-fare buses in Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Calgary, and Vancouver but they also on at least one occasion tore up rails and substituted a bus so that a higher fare could be charged. People, of course, did change their opinion once enough buses had reached senescence.
13
By helping out at rush hour, jitneys could strengthen public transit and enhance its appeal. It is even possible to restrict them to periods of peak demand, if regulatory authorities are prepared to admit part-timers there is no paradigm or exemplar to work from; instead it has to be constructed through the interaction of "relevant social groups" -"relevant" in the sense that they seek to impose their own definition upon the technology, and a "group" in the sense that they attach "the same set of meanings" to the artifact -in this case, the jitney. The relevant social groups should be determined empirically, rather than predetermined according to a model -whether pluralist or hierarchical -of Canadian society.
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According to the media of 1914-29, each of the following groups had a homogeneous interpretation of the jitney and a desire to shape it socially: owners and operators of street railways, municipal governments, motor vehicle manufacturers, auto dealers and distributors, organized motorists, labour unionists, downtown merchants, real estate developers, suburban homeowners, youth, women, and, of course, jitneyists. This list is too long to explore in depth in an article, especially as several of these groups were less unified than the media claimed. There is space to make only brief generalizations about the attempts of each of these groups to define the jitney.
To start -as did the industry -with the jitney operators, they were so divided that they were arguably not a "relevant social group" at all. However, they did agree, as shown by the name they chose for it, to define the jitney in terms of its fare. Also deterring investment in motorbuses was the widespread belief that they could not make a profit at a street railway fare, because they were smaller (with higher labour costs per seat-mile), were less mechanically reliable, and used more expensive fuel. 
28
Many of the jitneyists were thinking big: despite modest means, they were dreaming of one day commanding a fleet of jitneys. Their ranks in every city included "bus promoters," who clearly hoped to supplant the street railway and to become in the process as rich as Henry Ford or Sir William Mackenzie. The bus promoters assumed they would succeed only insofar as they offered service comparable to the electric railway; consequently, they promised (but never provided) extensive route networks, and, through their own carpentry or a body shop's, they converted the Model T Ford into a minibus seating as many as 16 to 20 passengers. Generally, this interpretation of the jitney -as transit bus -failed before 1920 because the increased size forfeited the jitney's two advantages: speed and manoeuvreability. Moreover, as the vehicle got larger so too did its maintenance and municipal tax bill. A bus simply could not, as the electric railways stridently announced, make a profit at a five-cent fare, and the bus promoters succeeded only where custom or distance allowed them to charge more -as in interurban runs. Those who wanted to provide a coordinated service realized they would need to cooperate: as a result, they had by August 1915 formed jitney associations (citywide and for specific routes) in each of the major centres in Canada, starting with the Vancouver Auto Public Service Association the preceding January. The associations assigned routes and schedules, set fares (for interurban trips or for route deviations), provided tickets and bookkeeping services, directed traffic at termini, and undertook the collective purchase of liability insurance, gasoline, tires, and other supplies. For these services the jitney owner paid a weekly fee, generally $2.50. No group in Canada was more unanimous in its interpretation of jitneys than the nation's trolley companies. Their unity would have guaranteed them an important say in the jitney's fate even had they not also been one It is tempting to see this hostile legislation as proof that street railways ran city government.
Yet most municipal politicians knew there were more votes to be gained from spiting than serving privately owned tram companies.
Negative regulation and later outright suppression of jitneys came about because the street railways had powerful allies at city hall. The jitneys quickly made enemies, for they threatened not only the profits of the street railway but also the economic and moral order that the trolley had helped to create.
Most apprehensive were the street railway's own employees: the jitney threatened their livelihoods. Everywhere the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees lobbied for the strict regulation, if not suppression, of the jitney. Organized labour in general, however, was ambivalent because jitneys -at least in the winter of 1914-15 -provided jobs to unemployed tradespeople, served working-class commuters, and in some jurisdictions (for example, Victoria, Ottawa, and Winnipeg) spawned new labour unions. Overall, however, the trade union movement opposed the jitney, as Eckert and Hilton have remarked, "out of loyalty to the Amalgamated," and out of concern for municipal ownership. In some cities, most notably Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, and Saskatoon (and in the end, Winnipeg), they actively assisted the lobbying efforts of the street railway companies against the intruder.
41
The interclass alliance in opposition to jitneys also included many property holders from the "streetcar suburbs" and the central business Women, they don't give a cuss When they ride a jitney bus; They don't hang on to a strap, But Ford right in and sit in your lap. 44 Even more worrisome for moral arbiters than "undue familiarity" amongst strangers was the amorous behaviour of young people who used the jitney for a cheap date (with consequent declines in theatre attendance reported in some American cities) or for dangerous liaisons. According to street railways and sympathetic media, women were a "relevant social group" whose interests lay in the suppression of the jitney. It is difficult to assess this damning contention, for despite the occasional incident (for example, a sexual assault in Hamilton), the "evidence" usually consisted of vague allusions to American "experience." Similarly, little hard evidence has surfaced to prove that Canadian women's groups were alarmed by the jitney. To be sure, Canadian Railway and Marine World claimed that women's councils in several American cities had condemned the jitney as a threat to public morals, but it could name no similar group in Canada, save for the Vancouver Juvenile Protective Association, which in December 1915 called for a ban on women riding jitneys at night.
47
Moral outrage found concrete expression in most cities in police regulations requiring each passenger to have her own seat, and in some places (for example, Vancouver) in regulations requiring lights to be kept burning over the rear seat from dusk until dawn when the top was up. Some women also saw in the jitney an opportunity (unless discriminatory regulation was passed, as in Hamilton) to become entrepreneurs. There were female jitneyists reported in several North American cities, including Toronto, Victoria, Ottawa, and Winnipeg, where, according to Saturday Night in July 1915, their cars were "more generously patronized than [those of] many of the men." Saturday Night thought their popularity was owed to gender stereotyping (to "careful handling" of the car by women drivers or male "gallantry"), but the emergence in Winnipeg and Montreal and in at least two American cities of jitney services operated by women for "women and children only" suggests that some women saw in the jitney an opportunity to extend the separate sphere. 50 The jitney, it would seem, was a paradoxical machine: it created opportunities for social segregation even as it imposed extraordinary (certainly for the times) interclass mixing.
Saturday Night observed in July 1915:
One takes a street car and pays no attention to any of the many passengers who may happen to be there at the time. But he gets into a jitney with the feeling that he is entering a more or less private equipage and with a certain amount of obligation to make the acquaintance of the other passengers, sit on their knees, or let them sit on his,... and be a sort of hail well met fellow, generally 51 The jitney offered a chance to re-establish a sense of community, of Gemeinschaft, on the There were many groups in Canada's cities in the 1915-29 period anxious to suppress the jitney; aside from jitneyists themselves and their customers (a socially disparate group, united mainly by relative youth and the value they placed on speed and time), the only "relevant social group" to defend the jitney was the automotive industry and its retainers. 53 Indeed, the street railways and their media allies claimed that the motor vehicle industry had dreamed up the jitney as a sales promotion. The tram companies stressed the involvement of the major automotive corporations in order to tarnish the jitney's "populist" credentials. In actual fact, auto industry involvement in the jitney movement had a small business bias. The main thrust came from dealers who saw in jitneys an opportunity to unload used cars. These had begun to accumulate on their lots in large numbers for the first time (as production of new cars soared and the fast pace of technical innovation rendered many older makes obsolete). Dealers had not yet devised networks for moving the cars they took in trade: however, they found they could rent or sell them for use as jitneys, and in Hostile forces pushed the government in every municipality towards jitney suppression. Politicians feared being held responsible for loss of the universal transit fare or, worse, of the trams themselves. They also wanted to avoid further legal battles with the street railways, which threatened to sue the city for breach of contract. Moreover, they did not want to have to levy new taxes to replace the revenue the jitneys cost local government.
The main problem with jitneys -and the ultimate reason for their suppression -was that they reduced street railway income, and hence the tax street railways had to pay to the city government. Everywhere cities had tapped into the monopoly profits of the street railways to extract large incomes for themselves. Jitney competition thus was The final suppression was brutal. The jitney did not simply wither away, as some historians suppose. It was finally eliminated by the ruthless but effective expedient of giving the local street railway either a veto over jitney routes or licences (Edmonton, 1921 ; Toronto, 1924) or an exclusive transportation franchise for the city (Vancouver, 1918; Winnipeg, 1918; Ottawa, 1923; and London, 1929) . In each case the city was able to extract concessions from the street railways -a bus route in Winnipeg, rail extensions in Ottawa -in exchange for the bans.
58
The jitneyists fought against extermination. In Hamilton, jitneyists were given two years to find alternative work, and yet dozens refused to accept the ban. For four months in 1928 they remained defiant, even as the police levied -at $20 a ticket -$45,000 in fines. and aspirations to the independent taxicab owner of today) who were anxious to remain independent and to avoid proletarianization.
Although rampant individualists, they quickly realized the need to form cooperatives if they were to have any chance for survival in the era of corporate capitalism.
They failed, the jitney failed, because they simply were unable to convince Canadians that populism -a world of small producers and cooperative egalitarianism -was a viable method of organizing the movement of people in the era of corporate capitalism.
Earlier we saw that jitneys might be justified because of the help they can potentially lend to public transit. Yet in the final analysis, jitneys are, and were, important only to the extent to which the survival of the petty proprietor is important to Canadian society.
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Regional Variations in the Canadian Jitney Experience
There The table presents the mean average of correspondent assessments for employment conditions in the various occupational categories for each city. It uses the Gazette's implicit five-point scale wherein "very quiet" + 1 ; "quiet" + 2; "fair" + 3; "active" + 4; "very active" + 5.
were tolerated, indeed encouraged, to avoid having to extend the municipal railway to a base that might shut down at war's end.
Saskatoon and Regina similarly regulated their jitneys out of existence to protect their municipal railways. In Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton, and Toronto unsympathetic regulators helped hasten the jitney to its grave, but no public intervention was necessary in Ottawa and Montreal, where it died of natural causes. In Ottawa the "Jitney Passenger Service," as Charles Lévesque and his associates called the two second-hand autos they operated on Rideau and Bank Streets in early April, quit after four days of running for "lack of patronage." A reporter for the Ottawa Evening Citizen wrote that "the people do not even seem to understand what the jitney is or just what is its object in trundling about the streets." The car made a paltry $2.70 its first day (to be shared with a hired driver), and it is neither surprising that Levesque's group failed to find new investors nor that Lévesque had no successors until the street railway strikes in 1918 and 191970
Ottawa's indifference may be explained by its being a civil service town. Notoriously Table 4 reveals that Ottawans did considerably less strap-hanging than residents of Toronto or of several large American cities. Given these ratios, it was not surprising that Ottawans, despite constant griping, were relatively uninterested in alternative forms of public transit. 71 Montrealers, by contrast, may have suffered the worst crowding of any rail users in Canada. Table 5 not only attests to this dubious distinction, but it also shows a rough equivalence between crowded trams and jitney popularity (the latter's "strongholds" being in boldface). The Ottawa Electric and the British Columbia Electric Railway (BCER) appear to be anomalous, but the aggregate data for both are misleading thanks to Ottawa's unique commuting habits and the inclusion of BCER's interurban system. No poet, the author of the ditty in the Star did grasp some of the factors in the demise of the jitney in Montreal and elsewhere. In general, the media blamed the collapse of the Montreal Jitney Association on its decision to abandon the nickel fare and upon the failure of its members to stick to their assigned route if sightseers offered to pay for a detour. 74 The behaviour of Montreal jitneyists made economic sense, once the swarming process failed to take place. In May 1915 the manager of the jitney association "said that there was a difficulty in getting cars to put on routes which the public ask[ed] to have opened up." As a result, there were too few jitneys on any route in Montreal to offer potential riders the kind of frequent headways (a car always in sight) that drew patronage to jitneys on Yonge Street in Toronto or Hastings Street in Vancouver. As a result, Montreal's jitneys failed to attract short-haul passengers (that is, within a range of 1.5 miles) and found that they had to raise their fare to a dime or more to cover their costs for hauling a handful of riders two miles or more. 
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In the six jitney strongholds in Ontario and the West, hundreds of individuals scrambled in each city to get into business, but in Montreal there was still not a jitney to be found more than 50 days after their emergence in Toronto. The public may have been ready to jitney, but the city's petty capitalists were not. As a result, three local auto dealerships tried to jumpstart the movement in order, it appears, to unload their used cars. The organizers of the Montreal Jitney Association were not, even so, willing to invest much money in the venture (they reportedly owned no jitneys themselves); instead they sought to create a jitney exchange to coordinate the operations (for example, routes, schedules, tickets) of independent jitneurs, who were expected to pay a fee of $2.50 a week to the association and to obey its dictates. This kind of approach to jitneying worked, as we shall see, in some cities; but it failed in Montreal for simple lack of interest from tradespeople, grocers, and the other sorts of petty entrepreneurs who filled jitney ranks in cities such as Hamilton. In Montreal perhaps car ownership had not spread as widely among this class as it had in points west, or -more Nov. 1925 :575, June 1926 : 325, Aug. 1926 : 443, Dec. 1926 ERJ, 46(4 Sept. 1915 
